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BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS YOU:
THE REPORTER-CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE WAKE
OF COHEN v. CO WLES MEDIA COMPANY
Historically, journalists have respected their sources' wishes to
remain anonymous.1 In fact, some reporters have even paid fines
' See Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law,
Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 817 (1983)
(illustrating certain instances where reporters refused to reveal their sources); see also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A reporter is no
better than his sources.").
Commentators have classified providers of confidential information into two groups:
"sources" and "sourcerers." See Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in
Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 709-10 (1991). Sources are
sympathetic whistleblowers, whose main motivation is to "impart[] true and important in-
formation to oversight bodies or to the press [in an attempt] to enhance government ac-
countability [and reveal] hidden abuse." Id. Sourcerers are "strategically manipulative
leaker[s[." Id. at 711. They consist of politically motivated members of government or of a
political campaign whose information tends to be self serving. See id. The sourcerer is gen-
erally perceived in an unsympathetic light:
Unlike the pure whistleblower, these anonymous sources are thought to be politi-
cally savvy. They act with selfish motives in order to promote their own agendas
rather than the public interest. Even if they believe they are acting to promote
public aims, their purpose in talking to the press 'is not so much to pass informa-
tion along to the public . .. [but rather] to use the press, and ultimately the
public, as a means to an end.'
Id. at 711-12.
Information gathered from sources and sourcerers has been used to test the waters for
potentially controversial government policies and has even been used by dissatisfied partici-
pants within an administration to torpedo planned actions the source opposes. See id. at
687. The motives of those who leak information has been classified by one commentator as
follows: the "ego leak," where the leaker leaks to satisfy a sense of self importance; the
"goodwill leak," where data is released with the goal of developing a good relationship with
the reporters involved; the "policy leak," which represents an attempt to influence govern-
ment policy and may be used to oppose or support a policy; the "animus leak," where the
leaker exacts revenge upon another person; and the "trial balloon leak," which exposes a
proposal in order to gauge public or media reactions. STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMIENT/
PRESS CONNECTION 77 (1984).
Another classification of confidential sources divides sources into two groups: "visible"
and "invisible" sources. See Alex S. Jones, Anonymity: A Tool Used and Abused, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1991, at A20. A "visible" source is one who is identified in an article as
speaking on the condition of anonymity. Id. Usually, this type of source is a government
official speaking "off the record." Id. "Invisible" sources are not mentioned at all in the
published story. Id. They provide information that is used by the journalist to write the
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and faced incarceration rather than expose their sources' identi-
ties. 2 A number of motives have been attributed to journalists' re-
spect for the confidentiality agreements.' A primary concern, how-
ever, is that information of public interest would cease to flow if
sources feared exposure. 4 This concern is very real,5 since confiden-
tial sources provide the media with many of their news stories."
story. Id. An "invisible" source "could be a whistleblower [or a] courthouse gossip carefully
cultivated by a reporter in hopes that friendship will lead to information." Id. Or, the invisi-
ble source could be a government official who provides a background briefing. Id. This Note
will refer to all sources generically as "sources."
Some commentators believe that the continued use of anonymous sources "perpetuates
the invisibility of the truly powerful," allowing them to control the public agenda which the
media likes to think it controls. See Jane D. Brown et al., Invisible Power: Newspaper News
Sources and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q., 45, 54 (1987).
2 See In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (reporter
spent time in jail and paid $100,000 fine for failing to produce documents for a murder
trial). There are also some early cases illustrating a journalist's willingness to accept punish-
ment, rather than breach confidentiality. See, e.g., Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375, 376 (Colo.
1919) (reporter imprisoned for failing to testify concerning alleged irregularities of sheriff's
impaneling of grand jury); In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011, 1012 (N.J. 1913) (reporter fined $25 for
refusing to disclose sources of information for libelous article); Ex parte Lawrence, 48 P.
124, 125 (Cal. 1897) (reporter imprisoned for failure to disclose source of information con-
cerning bribery allegations against state senators); Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 471-72
(D.C. Cir. 1848) (earliest reported case where reporter was imprisoned for failing to reveal
source to government body).
In 1734, John Peter Zenger, a German immigrant, spent nine months in jail for refusing
to reveal a source. FRANK B. LATHAM, THE TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 3 (1970). Zenger
printed a weekly pamphlet called the New-York Weekly Journal. Id. at 34. His newspaper
became the organ for a group opposed to the governor of New York colony, William Cosby.
See id. at 27. The governor had Zenger imprisoned for failing to identify the authors who
regularly lambasted him in Zenger's paper. See id. at 42.
1 Levi, supra note 1, at 633-35 (examining traditional bases for ethic of non-disclosure
concerning confidential sources).
See Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on
News Source Recbvery for Breach of a Confidential Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553,
1564 (1989) ("[Reporters] fear that if they become known for breaching confidentiality
agreements, existing and potential sources will 'dry up.' "). Another motive seems to be that
by keeping sources confidential, a journalist prevents other journalists from gaining access
to them. Levi, supra note 1, at 633 n.90.
Without confidentiality agreements, reporters would not be able to obtain information
from organized crime figures, for obvious reasons. See DAVID SHAW, PRESS WATCH 62 (1984).
See Dicke, supra note 4, at 1564 (noting reporters fear sources will dry up if confiden-
tiality agreements are not honored); Levi, supra note 1, at 633 (same).
6 See Vincent Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV.
229, 247 (1971) (stating that newspapers rely upon confidential sources for over 30% of their
stories); John E. Osborne, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empiri-
cal Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 57, 73 (1985)
(recent survey indicates that 31.25% of reporters rely on confidential sources); Dicke, supra
note 4, at 1563 ("[S]tudies show that eighty percent of national news magazine articles and
fifty percent of national wire service stories rely on confidential sources.").
COHEN v. COWLES
Particularly in recent years, reliance on confidential sources for the
gathering of news has greatly increased, due in part to the rise in
investigative journalism.7
Recently in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,' the Supreme Court
ruled that when a reporter promises confidentiality and that prom-
ise is broken, then the exposed source may recover damages.9 This
Note examines the issues before the Cohen court and suggests that
the case was properly decided. Part I will discuss the reporter-
source relationship. Part II examines the unique facts of Cohen
and its procedural setting, Parts III and IV analyze the reasoning
behind the Court's decision, and finally, Part V explores the effect
of the decision upon news gathering in the future.
I. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
While journalists have, for the most part, kept the identities of
their sources confidential, there existed no right at common law to
withhold a source's identity in a judicial proceeding.10 In
7 See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 7 (1974). Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein, the journalists who exposed the Watergate scandal, claim
that without reliance upon confidential sources, there would have been no Washington Post
story. Their confidential source, nicknamed "Deep Throat," remains unidentified to this
day. See Jones, supra note 1, at A20 ("[Promises] of confidentiality to news sources are the
grease that helps make the wheels of journalism turn, especially in investigative
reporting.").
8 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
9 Id. Despite the fair amount of press reporting on the subject, only four law review
articles appeared prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen examining the subject of
media liability in the event of a breach of the confidentiality agreement. See Levi, supra
note 1; Kathryn M. Kase, Note, When a Promise is Not a Promise: The Legal Conse-
quences for Journalists Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to Sources, 12 HASTINGS
Comm. & ENT. L.J. 565 (1990); Jens B. Koepke, Comment, Reporter Privilege: Shield or
Sword? Applying a Modified Breach of Contract Standard When a Newsperson "Burns" a
Confidential Source, 42 FED. Com. L.J. 277 (1990); Dicke, supra note 4. Journalists refer
to the voluntary disclosure of a source's identity as "burning" a source. See Dan Oberdorfer,
Is "Burning a Source" a Breach of Contract?, NAT. L.J., August 1, 1988, at 8.
10 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (noting there existed no privilege
at common law for journalists to refuse to disclose identities of confidential sources).
The refusal to recognize a special privilege for reporters at common law is based upon
two reasons: first, privileges restrict the use of relevant evidence at trial, and thus should
only be granted in extraordinary situations, see Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 562 P.2d
791, 794 (Idaho 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), and second, a special privilege for
reporters might tempt journalists "to invent the news [because of the] greater immunity
from having to validate a story." William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the
Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1, 16 (1980).
1993]
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Branzburg v. Hayes," the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not provide reporters with an absolute privilege
to refuse to reveal a confidential source before a grand jury. 2
Lower federal courts have interpreted Branzburg as permitting a
qualified privilege' 3 and have utilized the balancing test set forth
in the Branzburg dissent. 4 In attempting to provide statutory pro-
tection to reporters, and indirectly to confidential sources, many
states have enacted shield laws that create a special privilege for
reporters. 5
In recent years, however, an increasing number of reporters
have begun to voluntarily expose the names of their sources. 6 Ex-
" 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
12 See id. at 700.
[T]he investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental govern-
ment role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen ....
Calling reporters to give testimony in the manner and for the reasons that other
citizens are called 'bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the gov-
ernmental purpose asserted as its justification.'
Id. (citation omitted).
13 See, e.g., In re Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.) (noting that
because Justice Powell was deciding vote in Branzburg, his concurrence authorizing limited
privilege was incorporated into court's opinion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Bruno &
Stillman Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980) (reading Branzburg
as requiring disclosure only when need for source was compelling).
Branzburg requires a court to look at the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of
weighing the need for the testimony in question against the claims of the newsman that the
public's right to know is impaired. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
14 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Miller v. Transamerica
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Branzburg's three part test), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 717 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasizing factors
of three part test). The Branzburg dissent's three part test requires that the information
sought be relevant, that it cannot be obtained by alternative means, and that there is a
compelling interest which overrides all other interests in that information. 408 U.S. at 743
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confiden-
tial Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 13, 24 (1988).
' See Phillip R. Roach, The Newsman's Confidential Source Privilege in Virginia, 22
U. RICH. L. REV. 377, 387-88 n.70 (1988) (noting 26 states have enacted shield laws). The
news media, however, has never managed to have Congress pass a national shield law. See
generally Mark Neubauer, Comment, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg: The Case
for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160 (1976) (citing problems with Branzburg as
justification for enactment of federal shield law).
16 See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
July-Aug. 1988, at 21. Langley and Levine point out a number of recent instances in which
the names of confidential sources have been exposed by the press. Id. Bob Woodward iden-
tifies the late CIA director William Casey as a former confidential source. BOB WOODWARD,
VEIL: THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA 14 (1987). Another recent example involved the deci-
sion of Newsweek to reveal Oliver North as a source. Langley & Levine, supra, at 21. Colo-
nel North had testified at the Iran Contra hearings that Congressional leaks had under-
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posed sources who had been promised anonymity have brought
suit under various theories of recovery with varying degrees of suc-
cess.17 The Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen,"8 which held that the
news media can be held accountable for breach of a confidentiality
agreement on promissory estoppel grounds,"9 may radically
reshape the relationship between reporters and sources.
II. THE COHEN CASE
Dan Cohen was director of public relations for Minnesota In-
dependent-Republican gubernatorial candidate Wheelock Whitney
during the 1982 election.20 In the closing days of the campaign, Co-
hen offered several journalists some "dirt" on Marlene Johnson,
the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor." In particular,
Cohen revealed that twelve years earlier Johnson was arrested for
the shoplifting of six dollars worth of sewing supplies. 22 Reporters
from the Minneapolis Star & Tribune (now the Star Tribune) and
the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, among others, expressly
agreed that, in exchange for the information, they would not name
mined national security by causing the release of details of the capture of the Achille Lauro
hijackers to the press. Id. Newsweek reported that North himself was the source of this
information. Id.
Another way in which sources may be revealed is by the elimination of alternative
sources. Id. at 22. This occurred, for example, during the 1988 campaign for the Democratic
Presidential nomination when the New York Times reported that the Gephardt campaign
was not the source of the video that exposed Senator Joseph Biden as a plagiarist. Id. This
revelation made it obvious that the video was supplied by the Dukakis camp. Id.
' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 617 (Mass. 1969) (upholding
injunction based on filmmaker Wiseman's breach of contract due to failure to obtain signed
releases from all inmates he intended to use in film based on prison life), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960 (1970); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 584 P.2d 1310, 1313 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that newspaper was privileged to report name of 14-year-old victim of sexual
abuse, despite promise that victim's name would not be reported); Doe v. American Broad-
casting Co., 543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 455 (1st Dep't 1989) (rape victims, whose faces were made
recognizable during television appearance despite promise to keep them hidden, brought
breach of contract and tort claims; defendant's motion for summary judgement was denied
and case settled before trial).
-8 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
'9 Id. at 2516.
20 See Oberdorfer, supra note 9, at 8. Before the incident, Cohen had been involved in
public relations and politics and had served, at one time, as the President of the Minneapo-
lis City Council. Id. A graduate of Harvard Law School, he had written a well-received biog-
raphy of Hubert Humphrey. Id.
21 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 201 n.2 (Minn. 1990). Prior to the
sewing supply incident, Johnson had also been arrested for unlawful assembly at a protest
rally, but the charge was later dropped. Id.
22 Id.
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Cohen as the source.23 Despite these promises of confidentiality,
the editors of the two newspapers, over the objections of their re-
porters, decided that the newsworthiness of the source's identity
was reason enough to disclose the source. Such disclosure was un-
precedented at either newspaper.24 As a consequence of his expo-
sure, Cohen was immediately fired.26
Cohen filed suit against the two newspapers in Minnesota Dis-
trict Court alleging breach of the contract of confidentiality. 26 Co-
hen also sued the two reporters for misrepresentation. The judge
rejected the First Amendment free speech claims of the media de-
fendants28 and charged the jury under the common law of con-
tracts and misrepresentation.29 The jury awarded Cohen $200,000
in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.30
23 See id. at 200. Cohen spoke with Lori Sturdevant of the Tribune, Bill Salisbury of
the Dispatch, Gerry Nelson of the Associated Press, and David Nimmer of television station
WCCo and made the following offer:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in the upcom-
ing election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that I will
be treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in any material
in connection with this, and you will also agree that you're not going to pursue
with me a question of who the source is, then I'll furnish you with the documents.
Id. All four agreed, but only Nelson and Nimmer kept their promises. See id. at 201 n.1.
2 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992). "The editors
who countermanded the promises [made by the reporters to Cohen] conceded that never
before or since have they reneged on a promise of confidentiality." Id. Tribune reporter
Sturdevant was so upset the editors decided to reveal Cohen's name that she withheld her
byline from the article. See Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201.
" See Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 202.
26 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1461 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1987) (denying newspapers' summary judgment motions).
27 See id. at 1463.
28 See id. at 1464. The judge summarized defendants' First Amendment arguments as
follows:
Defendants are arguing that parties who enter into otherwise valid contractual
relationships with newspaper organizations ... may not rely on the newspaper's
promise to perform, even though that party may have performed fully his or her
part of the bargain ... because to require the newspaper to perform its agreement
would somehow operate to censor the news.
Id.
29 See id. at 1464 ("This is not a case about free speech, rather it is one about contracts
and misrepresentation.").
0 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2291 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1988) (denying motion for judgment n.o.v.). The judge passed judgment based upon the jury
verdict by reasoning that denying relief to an injured plaintiff "would be to deprive that
citizen of the protection of law without any countervailing benefit to the legitimate interest
of the public being informed. Rather than chill freedom of expression, such a result would
'encourage conduct by news media that grossly offends ordinary men.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
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A divided panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed
the breach of contract award,3' but dismissed the award for mis-
representation.12 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court dis-
missed the contract cause of action on state law grounds, 3 stating
that the source and reporter do not intend to enter into a formal
contract. Instead, the court opined that reporter-source confidenti-
ality agreements are based on relationships of trust and ethics and
are not intended by the parties to be legally enforceable.3 4 This
conclusion seems incorrect in light of the fact that all contractual
elements were present.3 5 In addition, the court, sua sponte, consid-
Defendants had moved for judgment n.o.v., arguing that allowing the verdict to stand
invited
[tihe potential for inventive plaintiffs' attorneys to play havoc with the news pro-
cess in ways which have nothing to do with the falsity of defamatory content of
the information published .... [S]uch situations may cause journalists to 'steer
wide of the unlawful zone,' cautiously restricting the flow of information to the
public.
Koepke, supra note 9, at 284 (quoting defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.); see also
Oberdorfer, supra note 9, at 8 (newspapers contending that expert testimony presented by
Cohen's attorney with respect to salary projections was unrealistic). See generally Jury
Awards $700,000 For Breach of Confidentiality, 15 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1593, 1593 (1988)
(discussion of damage award).
31 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
32 Id. at 259-60. The Court ruled that the misrepresentation award could not stand
because the simple failure to perform in the future did not amount to misrepresentation at
the time of the original contract. Id. Additionally, the reporters were unaware that they
lacked the authority to bind their newspapers. Id. at 260. Thus, their failure to tell Cohen of
this lack of capacity did not constitute fraud. Id.
Regarding the contract claim, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the claim by
finding: 1) there was no state action, id. at 254-55; 2) and even if there were a state action,
"the government ... interest in protecting the expectation of a person who freely enters into
a contract" outweighs the press's First Amendment rights to gather the news since the
"[press] cannot rely on the first amendment to shield themselves from criminal or civil lia-
bility simply because the acts giving rise to such liability were taken while in pursuit of
newsworthy information," id. at 256-57; and 3) the news media defendants waived whatever
First Amendment rights they did have to publish the information by entering into an ex-
press contract of confidentiality. Id. at 258. "[The reporters] understood that they were
waiving the right to publish a potentially newsworthy item in return for obtaining another
potentially newsworthy item from Cohen." Id.
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990).
" See id. at 203. The court stated:
The law ... does not create a contract where the parties intended none .... In
other words, contract law seems here an ill fit for a promise of news source confi-
dentiality. To impose a contract theory on this arrangement puts an unwarranted
legal rigidity on a special ethical relationship, precluding necessary consideration
of factors underlying that ethical relationship.
Id.
11 See Larry Bodine, The Cost of Burning a Source, 9 Com. LAw., Winter 1991, at 13.
"The Minnesota high court found there was an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and mu-
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ered promissory estoppel3 6 as a ground for recovery, and indicated
that this theory may better fit the facts of this case.37 The court,
however, refused to allow recovery on these grounds, reasoning
that public debate would be chilled .3  The court held that this
would be an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment
because it would hinder the exercise of "'editorial control and
judgment,' a process critical to the First Amendment guarantees of
the free press."3 9 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with
tual intent to keep the promise. But, incredibly, the court found there was no contract." Id.
"[Als a general norm of contract law, parties need not in fact consider or intend the legal
consequences of the actions by which they manifest their assent in order to be bound ....
In any event . . . the objective theory of contract interpretation has dominated contract
rhetoric since the mid-19th century." Levi, supra note 1, at 667-68. But cf. Langley & Le-
vine, supra note 16, at 24 ("ethical, not legal, considerations should determine whether a
journalist, once having promised confidentiality, should go back on his word").
Perhaps a more persuasive argument for the court would have been to have admitted
that a contract was formed, but to deem it unenforceable as against public policy. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (discussing public policy/enforcement
balancing).
36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.
Id.
37 See Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203-04.
38 Id. at 205.
"' See id. at 204-05. The court noted that it would be required, if it applied promissory
estoppel, to second guess the newspaper editors decision as to the newsworthiness of Co-
hen's name and whether publishing it was necessary to a fair and balanced story. Id.
The idea that the processes involved in coming to editorial decisions may not be scruti-
nized in civil actions was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 158-77 (1979), in which the Court held that a journalist's thoughts about the
information he gathers, as well as the conversations with the editor involved, are not im-
mune from discovery in a libel suit. Id. The Court reasoned that since the actual malice
standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires an aggrieved party to
show the state of mind of the defendant, privilege for the editorial processes would erect an
"impenetrable barrier" to plaintiff's use of such evidence, thereby making it impossible to
ever prove malice with "convincing clarity." Id. at 170. If an examination of the editorial
processes is allowed in defamation suits, it is submitted that there is no reason why Cohen
should have been precluded from probing the thought processes of the editor if he were
required to prove a similar mental state to recover under a promissory estoppel cause of
action.
Prior to Lando, the Supreme Court, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. u. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 258 (1974), stated, "The choice of material to go into a newspaper ... constitute[s]
the exercise of editorial control and judgment." That case involved a state "right of reply
statute," and the Court invalidated the statute. Id. at 244, 258. It is not clear whether the
reasoning of Miami Herald applies to Cohen since the aspect of voluntariness present in
COHEN v. COWLES
this interpretation and remanded to the Minnesota Supreme
Court for further consideration of possible state legal or constitu-
tional impediments to Cohen's recovery.4 On remand, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court reinstated the jury award under the theory of
promissory estoppel. The court declined to read its state constitu-
tion in a way which extends greater rights under its freedom of the
press clause than the United States Supreme Court found under
the Federal Constitution. 42
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court, Justice White stated that this action to
enforce the confidentiality agreement did not fall under a line of
Supreme Court cases, exemplified by Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing43 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.,44 that held that any regulation
which punished the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained ma-
terial must "further a state interest of the highest order."4 Rather,
the Court found that this case was controlled "by the equally well-
established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforce-
ment against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather
and report the news. 416 Thus, a reporter may not trespass to
gather a story,47 nor may an editor print material in violation of
Cohen is absent from Miami Herald, in which the editor was required to publish a particu-
lar item. Id.
40 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). See infra notes 43-64 and accom-
panying text. The Court, however, agreed with the Minnesota high court that the Minnesota
Court of Appeals had erred in finding no state action: "The rationale of our decisions in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and subsequent cases compels the conclusion that there is
state action here." Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517-18.
41 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
2 See Cohen, 479 N.W.2d 387, 390-92 (Minn. 1992) (finding defendant's motive was to
"[hang] Mr. Cohen out to dry because they didn't regard him very highly as a source"); see
also Margaret Zack, Court Restores Cohen Award, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., January 24,
1992, at 1A (report of Minnesota Supreme Court's decision by one of defendant
newspapers).
43 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
44 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
4, Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103).
46 Id.
47 See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518; Le Mistral v. C.B.S., 61 A.D.2d 491, 493-94, 402
N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1st Dep't 1978) (holding First Amendment no bar to award of damages
for television crew's trespassing upon plaintiff's restaurant); Prahl v. Brosamle 295 N.W.2d
768, 780-81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting press defendant's claim that First Amendment
granted privilege to trespass to get story); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, 596 P.2d 832,
838-40 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (holding torts committed while gathering news not protected by
1993]
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the copyright laws.48 The Court distinguished Cohen from the first
line of cases by emphasizing three points. First, the Court stated
"that it was unclear whether the information in question was 'law-
fully' [obtained,] . . . at least for the purposes of publishing it
[, because] .. . [defendants] obtained Cohen's [information] only
by making a promise which they did not honor."4 9 Next, the Court
found that the award of compensatory damages did not amount to
"punishment" of the defendants, since compensating Cohen simply
placed him in as good a position as he would have been in had the
First Amendment); see also State v. Lashinsky, 404 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 1979) (finding no
right to enter restricted accident scene to cover story).
Additionally, reporters may not commit torts against their news subjects in the process
of gathering the news. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1973) (no
right to assault news target); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971)
(First Amendment does not protect media from tortious invasion of news subject's privacy).
4' See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (hold-
ing copyright action for publication of ex-president Ford's memoirs not barred by First
Amendment); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-79
(1977) (allowing plaintiff, whose entire "human cannonball" performance was shown on de-
fendant's news broadcast, to sue under the state's "right of publicity" cause of action).
Media organizations are also subject to laws which apply to them in their capacity as
commercial entities. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-31 (1937) (media
organizations covered under National Labor Relations Act notwithstanding First Amend-
ment); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (media orga-
nizations subject to Fair Labor Standards Act).
11 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. The Court stressed that the right to publish truthful infor-
mation is explicitly conditioned upon the fact that it is lawfully gathered. Id.; see also Flor-
ida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (maintaining that press is constitutionally protected when publish-
ing lawfully obtained truthful information of public nature); Smith, 443 U.S. at 103 (noting
that "once the truthful information was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the
court could not constitutionally restrain its dissemination"); Oklahoma Publishers Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (holding that First and Fourteenth Amendments
protect publication of name and photo of juvenile where such information had been publicly
revealed in court); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (determin-
ing that state cannot constitutionally punish publication of rape-murder victim's name ob-
tained from public courthouse records).
Professor Laurence Tribe, critical of the Court's focus on whether the information has
been legally secured, notes that "[tihe same concerns for truth and self-censorship .. .ar-
guably apply to both lawfully and unlawfully obtained materials ... since the question of
.what is lawful?' cannot be answered without reference to the First Amendment." LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-21, at 966 n.6 (2d ed. 1988). See also MARC
A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 481 (4th ed. 1990).
[U]nderlying cases like Cox Broadcasting is the notion that the reporter obtained
the information legally. If the reporter had stolen it, it is not clear that the same
result would have followed .... In the appropriation cases it seems likely that if
the published material in question has been stolen or obtained through tortious
behavior that fact would have affected the legal analysis.
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breach not occurred. 0 Finally, the Court stated that "the parties
themselves . . . [must] determine the scope of their legal obliga-
tions and any restrictions which may be placed on the publication
of truthful information."'"
The Court further rejected the claim that Cohen was merely
using promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing "the strict
requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim" in New
York Times v. Sullivan.5 2 Stressing that Cohen's theory of recov-
ery was based properly on contract, rather than defamation princi-
ples, the Court noted that Cohen was "not seeking damages for
injury to his reputation or his state of mind. He sought damages in
excess of $50,000 for a breach of a promise that caused him to lose
his job and lowered his earning, capacity. '53
IV. ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE WHITE'S OPINION
The Cohen Court has in effect limited the applicability of New
York Times and its progeny to cases involving a limited class of
01 See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. The court posited that had the agreement between the
parties contained a liquidated damages provision, any payment to Cohen "would represent a
cost of acquiring newsworthy material to be published at a profit, rather than a punishment
imposed by the State. The payment of compensatory damages in this case is constitutionally
indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a confidential news source." Id.
51 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. But see id. at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter maintained that the Court incorrectly concluded that the newspaper had established
its own restrictions on publication by promising not to print Cohen's name. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
This suggests both the possibility of waiver, the requirements of which have not
been met here . . . as well as the conception of the First Amendment rights as
those of the speaker alone, with a value that may be measured without reference
to the importance of the information to public discourse.
Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 2519. New York Times and subsequent cases established standards of liability
which have the effect of protecting media defendants in defamation lawsuits brought by
public officials or public figures. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
The public official or public figure plaintiff must generally prove that defendant's publica-
tion was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disre-
gard for its truth. See id. at 279-80; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (applying actual malice standard to publication based tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that false light
invasion of privacy was subject to actual malice standard). But see, Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (declining to apply the actual malice standard where plain-
tiff is a private figure).
11 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. But see id. at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the majority and found the analogy to reputation-based injury
cases, such as Hustler, appropriate. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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common-law causes of action.54 It is submitted that only those
common-law claims whose actionability rests solely on an act of
expression and/or publication (e.g., defamation or false light) will,
after Cohen, be subject to New York Times-type constitutional
scrutiny. Conversely, causes of action based on laws of general ap-
plicability are free from First Amendment constraints.5 5 Unlike
defamation, which applies specifically to publication, Cohen's as-
sertion of a promissory estoppel claim relates to general contract
law, germane to transactions between any parties concerning any
subject.56 Although the breach in this case was manifested in a
publication, that event is not itself central to Cohen's theory of
recovery under promissory estoppel. 7
The Court's reliance upon the neutral application of generally
applicable laws is not unprecedented in freedom of the press juris-
', See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). In
Gertz, Justice White expressed his disdain for the broad application of constitutional stan-
dards to common-law causes of action by commenting that "the Court, in a few printed
pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important
respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 States." Id. (White, J., dis-
senting). See also Levi, supra note 1, at 661 n.170 ("If, in fact, the New York Times ap-
proach is analytically flawed and often arbitrary, why should it be extended into yet another
domain [such as contract law]?").
5" See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a
law of general applicability. It does not target or single out the press. Rather, in so
far as we are advised, the doctrine is generally applicable to the daily transactions
of all the citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does not forbid its applica-
tion to the press.
Id.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971). In
Dietemann, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant defendant Time's First Amendment protec-
tion from plaintiff's invasion of privacy action merely because it had published the informa-
tion it had wrongfully gathered. Id. The court held that:
privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy
actions in which publication is an essential component are not relevant in deter-
mining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication .... A rule forbid-
ding the use of publication as an ingredient of damages would deny to the injured
plaintiff recovery for real harm done to him ....
Id. (emphasis added).
One factor that distinguishes Cohen from publication-based torts is that in defamation
cases, publication triggers the cause of action. See MAss MEDIA LAW, supra note 49, at 233-
34 (discussing publication element of defamation in light of mass media defendants). How-
ever, in the context of suits arising from reporter-source agreements, publication acts not as
the trigger of liability, but instead as evidence of one party's breach of the agreement. See,
e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 2-10 (3d ed. 1987)
(bilateral contract formed and legal obligations adhere at moment of exchange of mutual
promises).
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prudence. s Its reaffirmation in Cohen is particularly significant in
light of the Supreme Court's recent application of the doctrine to
the First Amendment's free exercise clause in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 9 in which the Court upheld a Wisconsin drug stat-
ute that did not provide an exception for the ceremonial use of
peyote by Native Americans.6 The Smith Court ruled that, since
the drug law was one of general applicability, the incidental effect
upon activities pursuant to the exercise of First Amendment rights
was of no constitutional significance. 1
Although the only cause of action before the Cohen Court was
based on promissory estoppel,6 2 the Court's language strongly indi-
51 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("IT]he First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of
civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.").
' 494 U.S. 812 (1990).
GO See id. at 886 n.3 ("[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect
of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest."); see also David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not
"Them"!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 273,
281-95 (1991) (suggesting that Smith vitiated the Free Exercise Clause of all its meaning);
Kennith Matin, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State
of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 1431 (1991) (suggesting that Smith severely
limited Free Exercise Clause); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defending Smith's rejection of constitutionally
compelled Free Exercise exemptions for religious practices); Edward E. Smith, The
Criminalization of Belief: When Free Exercise Isn't, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1501-03 (1991)
(suggesting that Smith significantly narrowed scope of free exercise protection).
"1 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. But see Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter argued that all laws restricting First Amendment rights must be subject to
some type of balancing to insure constitutionality. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). "[T]here is
nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Justice O'Conner's concurrence in Smith, 494 U.S. at 901); Karl Olson & Benjamin
A. Holden, An Oath of Silence, THE RECORDER, Oct. 14, 1991, at 8 ("[Cohen] is significant
[because] of its relationship to the disturbing series of recent cases in which the court has
held that a challenged law is subject only to minimal scrutiny because its impact on a con-
stitutional right is merely incidental.").
Recently, the Supreme Court has declined to extend the rationale of Cohen and Smith.
In Simon & Schuster Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991),
the Court struck down a New York law which confiscated money made pursuant to a book
contract with a criminal-the so-called "Son of Sam" law. Id. The Court rejected the state's
arguments that the law was one of general applicability "because it imposes a general bur-
den on any 'entity'." Id. at 509. The Court excluded from the category of "generally applica-
ble laws" any regulation that imposes a content-based financial disincentive. See id. (distin-
guishing Cohen and holding that the government can never impose content-based
regulations upon speech).
12 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517; see Olson & Holden, supra note 61, at 8 ("[s]trictly speak-
ing, a Minnesota resident still cannot maintain a contract cause of action for breach of
promise of confidentiality; the action is for promissory estoppel.").
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cates that enforcement of reporter-source confidentiality agree-
ments on a strict contract basis would likewise pass constitutional
muster.63 As Justice White stated, "the First Amendment does not
confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises
that would otherwise be enforced under state law." '6 4
V. POST-COHEN NEws-GATHERING
The effects of Cohen have been significant. In Ruzicka v.
Conde Nast," also decided under Minnesota law, Jill Ruzicka, a
victim of sexual abuse at the hands of a psychiatrist, was ap-
proached for an interview by a reporter for Glamour magazine.6 6
As a precondition to consenting to the interview, Ms. Ruzicka in-
sisted that she remain unidentifiable.6 7 Before publication, how-
ever, the article had undergone a number of revisions that made
Ms. Ruzicka's identity obvious to anyone familiar with her. 8 Ru-
zicka brought suit, and the federal district court granted the de-
fendant magazine's motion for summary judgment 9 and declined
to follow the then-recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in
Cohen II, which upheld a contract recovery.70 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, basing its decision on the Supreme
Court decision in Cohen, remanded the case for consideration of a
newly-pleaded promissory estoppel cause of action.7 1 There have
11 See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
64 Id.
65 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
66 Id. at 579.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 580. Prior to publication, Glamour's reporter read to Ruzicka a preliminary
draft of the article which did not mention her by name and did not discuss her service on a
Minnesota task force on therapist-patient sexual abuse. Id. When the article was published,
it did state that the names had been changed, but the story was attributed to a "Jill Lund-
quist," using Ruzicka's real first name, and it mentioned her service on the task force, of
which she was the only female member. Id. The article also noted that Ruzicka was an
attorney and referred to her lawsuit against her psychiatrist. Id.
11 Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Pub., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1300-01 (D. Minn. 1990).
70 See id. at 1294. The district court concluded that it was not bound by the state
court's decision in Cohen II on questions concerning the First Amendment. See id. The
court held that the First Amendment bars enforcement of breach of contract suits arising
from the promise of confidentiality unless:, 1) plaintiff can prove the existence of specific
and unambiguous terms of agreement; and 2) plaintiff can prove the breach of those terms
by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1300.
1 Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Pub., Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 583 (8th Cir. 1991). It is suggested
that plaintiff Ruzicka was a much more sympathetic character than Dan Cohen, an active
political supporter in an election campaign. Ruzicka's name itself was not newsworthy, thus
neutralizing in Ruzicka one of the key arguments available to the defense in Cohen. More-
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been similar cases in the lower courts. 2
The reaction of the press aid First Amendment commentators
to the Cohen holding has been negative.7 3 The criticism has
pointed to the "chilling effect" the enforcement of reporter-source
agreements will have upon the news-gathering and editorial
over, contrary to Cohen, the media defendant in Ruzicka approached Ms. Ruzicka. Id. at
579. Consequently, it cannot be argued that Ruzicka placed herself into the stream of jour-
nalistic commerce. Although dissenting in Cohen, Justice Souter nevertheless allowed for
the possibility that a non-public figure could constitutionally maintain an action against a
media defendant for the breach of a promise of confidentiality. See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at
2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). Ruzicka may be such a case.
72 See, e.g., Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 311 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (declining to
apply Cohen where newspaper promised to use silhouette of victim of sexual abuse and
instead printed photo with features recognizable); O'Connell v. Housatonic Valley Publish-
ing Co., No. 0055284, 1991 WL 258157, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that Cohen
did not apply where plaintiff requested anonymity, reporter gave no assurances, and plain-
tiff failed to seek recovery in contract); Anderson v. Gannett, Inc., 573 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831-32
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. 1991) (denying media defendant's request for summary judge-
ment based on court's application of "unlawfully obtained" reasoning of Cohen). In Ander-
son, a newspaper had failed to comply with its promise that an HIV positive patient's photo
would not make him recognizable. Id. at 829-30. Plaintiff's estate had successfully sued de-
cedent's doctor for breach of patient-physician confidentiality and the doctors sought in-
demnity from the newspaper. Id. at 829. The court held that this was a proper case in which
to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 832. See alsb Linda Greenhouse, Jus-
tices Rule Press Can be Sued For Divulging a Source's Identity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1991,
at A21 (quoting Jane Kirtley, executive director of Reporters Committee for Freedom of
Press saying that "similar cases had been filed around the country and that the [Supreme
Court's] ruling [in Cohen] today would encourage more").
71 See, e.g., Aaron Epstein, Decision on First Amendment Media Can Be Sued if Se-
cret Information Revealed, High Court Rules, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 1991, at Al (" 'It's
a terrible decision .... It opens the door to a flood of lawsuits by people who will say they
were identified after they were promised anonymity' ") (quoting Jane Kirtley); Martin
Garbus, The Big Chill on Free Speech, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1991, at 63 ("The Supreme Court
conclud[ed], in effect, that the right to publish information that could affect the outcome of
an election is less important than the right of a confidential source to punish the media for
revealing his identity."); Greenhouse, supra note 72, at A21 ("[Supreme Court's decision in
Cohen contained] a lot of dangerously broad language.") (quoting First Amendment lawyer
Lee Levine); David G. Savage, Media Must Keep Promises to Sources, Justices Rule, L.A.
TIMES, June 25, 1991, at Al ("Media lawyers feared that the ruling could inspire a new
round of lawsuits against the press."). But see Bodine, supra note 35, at 12 ("The facts,
logic, and emotion of this case go against the paper."); William P. Cheshire, James Madison
Did Not Contemplate Giving a License to Lie, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 30, 1991, at E4 (argu-
ing Court decided Cohen correctly); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Gambling With Free Speech; News
Organizations Risk Damaging the First Amendment by Claiming That It Licenses Jour-
nalists to Engage in Unethical Conduct, THE RECORDER, Apr. 3, 1991, at 4 (expressing sup-
port for Cohen, but fearing that claims of media in Cohen will convince Court to devalue
reporter-source relationship in future); The Press and Its Promises, PHOENIX GAZETE, June
26, 1991, at A12 ("The First Amendment is a wondrous vaccine. But even it cannot-should
not-be used to protect against a broken promise.").
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processes.74 It is proposed, however, that this argument is mis-
placed. Without assurances that a journalist will honor promises of
confidentiality, sources will dry up.75 Moreover, some reporters
have even expressed satisfaction with the Cohen decision.76 These
74 See Koepke, supra note 9, at 284 (situation in Cohen "may cause journalists to 'steer
wide of the unlawful zone,' cautiously restricting the flow of information to the public")
(quoting defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. after the initial jury verdict in Cohen);
Richard N. Winfield, Standing a Privilege on its Head, 7 COMM. LAW., Spring 1989, at 4. "If
expression is to be protected, that protection must be sufficiently broad to cover ingenious
claims and theories. To do otherwise would be to emasculate those protections and chill free
expression." Id.
Shortly after the initial jury verdict in Cohen, one of defendant newspapers experienced
a self-imposed "chill." See Levi, supra note 1, at 663 n.176. Fearing another lawsuit, the
newspaper withdrew all 640,000 copies of their Sunday magazine after a source named in an
article claimed she had been promised anonymity. Id.
1 See Samuel Fifer, Decision Backing Press Freedom Has Ominous Undertone, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 1990, at 23 (criticizing Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Co-
hen III). "[S]ources may be less willing to trust reporters, especially if they have no remedy
when promises of confidentiality are repudiated. One may well wonder how willing a future
"Deep Throat" would be to come forward if he has nothing, short of faith in human nature,
to rely on for his continuing anonymity .... " Id.; see also The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177, 283 (1991) (arguing that opposite result in Cohen "would
reduce the stock of information by dissuading potential sources from providing informa-
tion"); Cheshire, supra note 73, at E4 (criticizing Justice Souter's dissenting opinion that
important electoral information might be suppressed if Cohen were allowed to prevail).
"Over the long run if newspapers don't keep their word, people who have information will
quit sharing it with reporters, and the net effect will be less information for the public, not
more." Id.
Some empirical studies have suggested that the threat that a journalist might be com-
pelled to name a source before a grand jury has little effect on sources coming forward. See
Levi, supra note 1, at 663 n.177. These data, however, were gathered in the subpoena con-
text. Id. It can be argued that these studies bear little relevance to the chilling effect that
voluntary disclosure may have. Id. When a source sees a reporter going to jail and facing
large monetary penalties rather than revealing a source, the very act of resisting reassures
potential sources of the journalist's good faith and may make a source willing to risk the
relatively rare cases in which a reporter is actually compelled to reveal his source. See id. at
663 n.177; cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972) (discussing empirical studies
on inhibiting effects of subpoenas compelling reporters to disclose sources).
6 See Olson & Holden, supra note 61, at 8 ("[s]ome reporters at the Star Tribune
reportedly expressed their sentiment during the trial that the newspaper should lose Co-
hen's suit.").
Reporters and editors may be fundamentally at odds with respect to the confidential
source situation. See Levi, supra note 1, at 693 n.294. The reporter's ability to gather infor-
mation depends to some extent upon his perceived authority to offer promises of anonymity.
See id. Editors, on the other hand, have to consider the interests of the newspaper as an
institution, with the associated potential liabilities. Id. During the oral argument before the
Supreme Court in Cohen, Justices Scalia and Souter posed a hypothetical to defendants'
counsel John French: What if "the editors had decided to keep the reporter's promise but
the reporter then decided to breach it and bring out the whole truth by leaking Cohen's
identity to another publication. Would the newspaper have a claim against the reporter?"
Taylor, supra note 73, at 4. One commentator reported French's response in the following
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reporters reason that sources will feel secure knowing they can
count on a reporter's promises and will be more willing to come
forward with information.7 7
In the post-Cohen era, the news media should consider imple-
menting some of the following precautions in dealing with confi-
dential sources: 1) all sources should be clearly instructed that in
the event the newspaper is sued for libel, it may have to reveal the
source;78 2) publications should settle quickly with negligently
identified private figure sources, such as the Jill Ruzicka's of the
world;79 and 3) actions instituted by politically motivated sources
should be defended vigorously based on defenses available in con-
tract actions.80 Additionally, since a reporter may be acting with
manner:
Why sure, responded French, suddenly sounding more like a management-labor
lawyer than a champion of the First Amendment. Why, that would be turning
over "proprietary information." Why, that would violate the reporter's fiduciary
duties to his employer-promises that, French implied, are far more sacred than a
mere reporter's promise to a mere source.
Id.
Justice Kennedy found that this reasoning amounted to "a very odd calculus." Id.
7 See Olson & Holden, supra note 61, at 8 (noting that some supporters of press reluc-
tantly support result in Cohen because different result would have stripped cloak of confi-
dentiality from sources).
78 See Langley & Levine, supra note 16, at 22. Some courts have practically stripped
news media defendants of their New York Times protection when they have refused to re-
veal where they obtained allegedly libellous information. See, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116
F.R.D. 438, 452 (D. Nev. 1987) (ruling that if newspaper bases its defense upon reliability of
its sources, reporter's privilege will be deemed to have been waived); DeRoburt v. Gannett
Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 886-87 (D. Haw. 1981) (defendants in libel case must disclose source
of information or face presumption that they had no source for purposes of determining
actual malice); Georgia Communications Corp. v. Horne, 294 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982) (upholding default judgement against radio announcer who refused to reveal source);
Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 415 A.2d 683, 685-86 (N.H. 1980) (libel defendant re-
quired to identify source subject to presumption that no source exists).
Since plaintiffs may argue that the truth or falsity of an alleged libel can only be deter-
mined by revealing a source's name, libel suits are where reporters face the greatest pressure
to reveal sources. See Langley & Levine, supra note 16, at 22.
"I' See Taylor, supra note 73, at 4 (suggesting that press defendants' decision to litigate
rather than settle with Dan Cohen only gave Supreme Court opportunity to diminish re-
porter's privilege).
10 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 57, § 13-5, at 547-48. In two common situations,
certain defenses would likely be available to media defendants. Id. If a court orders a re-
porter to reveal the name of a confidential source, supervening illegality may be raised to
defend a breach of contract claim brought by the revealed source. Id. In the event that a
revealed source has delivered false information, the reporter can argue that the failure of
the implied condition that the proffered information be true discharges him from his duty
to perform. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(2) (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 57, § 11-16. If the reporter can prove that the source knew that the information
1993]
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apparent authority8' to bind his editor to promises of confidential-
ity, in light of Cohen, if he is required to obtain an editor's ap-
proval before he may make a promise of confidentiality, it is im-
perative that he reveal this fact to the source prior to receiving the
information. 2
The original decision of the two Minnesota newspapers to re-
veal Dan Cohen's name was met with almost universal condemna-
tion by the journalism community,83 and has been characterized as
"reprehensible" and "contrary to the core principles of journalistic
ethics. '8 4 Enforcing agreements of confidentiality essentially asks
the press to follow its own, self-imposed standards.8 s Moreover, the
journalists' technical First Amendment arguments in Cohen mini-
mized the sanctity of the reporter-source compact to such an ex-
tent that future courts in traditional "reporter's privilege" cases
may be less inclined to give credence to a reporter's recitation of
his obligations toward his source. 6 Freedom of the press scholar
Floyd Abrams has criticized the defendant press's legal arguments
in Cohen by saying that what was missing was "nothing less than a
sense of values .... If the press has values it cares about, it should
was false, the misrepresentation would make the contract voidable. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1).
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 8B (1958). Apparent authority is based
upon the conduct of the principal in holding the agent out as having authority which he has
actually not been given. Id. § 8. An agent may also have the power, based on estoppel, to
bind a principal where a third party has relied to his detriment upon a holding out effectu-
ated by silence or misrepresentation. Id. § 8B.
82 See Kenneth M. Vittor, Of "Fabricated Quotations" and Broken Promises: Implica-
tions for Publishers and Broadcasters of Masson v. New York Magazine and Cohen v.
Cowles Media Company, 9 COMM. L., Fall 1991, at 13.
83 See Vittor, supra note 82, at 13.
84 See id. (quoting Floyd Abrams).
88 See Dicke, supra note 4, at 1565 n.64 (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD CODE OF
ETHICS (1934)). The American Newspaper Guild's Code of Newsman's Ethics states: "'New-
spapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information
in court or before judicial or investigative bodies.'" Id.
88 See Vittor, supra note 82, at 14 ("If after Cohen, the press expects continued First
Amendment and state shield law protection for confidential source agreements, greater con-
sideration must be given by the media regarding the adverse consequences of publishers and
broadcasters breaching such agreements."); Taylor, supra note 73, at 4.
The looming danger is a possible holding that the First Amendment has nothing
to say about reporters and their sources-which would destroy the fragile princi-
ple that currently protects sources from court ordered disclosure. That is one rea-




articulate them lest it be understood to have no values at all. 8 7
CONCLUSION
The Constitution has never been interpreted to give the press
absolute immunity from the consequences of its deliberate actions
when these actions harm others. 8 While media defendants have
insisted that the punishment of an editor's decision to publish the
name of a source who has been promised anonymity is a violation
of their First Amendment rights, this argument stretches the First
Amendment beyond its purpose. If private individuals can sue the
press for defamation, a clearly publication-based tort, then there is
no reason why they should be precluded from enforcing an agree-
ment of confidentiality. The decision not to publish a source's
name is made by the editors when they send their reporters into
the world clothed with the actual or apparent authority to enter
into binding confidentiality agreements.8" At any time,
the editor may change the policy of the newspaper-
prospectively-and warn sources that they speak at their peril. But
the editor should not be heard to say, after a source has relied to
his detriment upon the decision to grant confidentiality, that he
may renege on the agreement and publish the source's name.90 To
allow such a result would "encourage conduct by news media that
grossly offends ordinary men."'91
Joseph W. Ragusa
V See Vittor, supra note 82, at 14 (quoting Abrams's recent speech concerning Cohen
decision).
" See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972) ("[A newspaper publisher] has
no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389-90 (1967) (finding calculated falsehood not protected by First Amendment); Galella
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding First Amendment is no "wall of
immunity" protecting newsmen's conduct while gathering news); Dietemann v. Time Inc.,
449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (d6termining tortious acts committed while gathering
news not protected by First Amendment).
11 See supra note 81 (definition of apparent authority).
10 See Cohen V, 479 N.W.2d. at 392 ("It was [the] ... long-standing journalistic tradi-
tion [of keeping sources confidential] that Cohen, who ha[d] worked in journalism, relied
upon in asking for and receiving a promise of anonymity."); see also Cheshire, supra note
73, at E4. "A newspaper that pledges to protect its news sources, accepts the proffered infor-
mation, publishes it and then goes back on its commitment is entitled to neither respect nor
protection against a lawsuit." Id.
91 Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 250.
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